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Abstract. Hamsi is one of 14 remaining candidates in NIST’s Hash
Competition for the future hash standard SHA-3. Until now, little anal-
ysis has been published on its resistance to differential cryptanalysis,
the main technique used to attack hash functions. We present a study
of Hamsi’s resistance to differential and higher-order differential crypt-
analysis, with focus on the 256-bit version of Hamsi. Our main results
are efficient distinguishers and near-collisions for its full (3-round) com-
pression function, and distinguishers for its full (6-round) finalization
function, indicating that Hamsi’s building blocks do not behave ideally.
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1 Introduction
Hash functions are one of the most ubiquitous primitives in cryptography, with
digital signatures and integrity checks as their main applications. Collision at-
tacks on the deployed standards MD5 and SHA-1 [18–21] have weakened the
confidence in the MD family of hash functions. Hence, the US Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology (NIST) launched a public competition to develop a future
SHA-3 standard [13].
The hash function Hamsi [8] is one of 64 designs submitted to NIST in fall
2008. Hamsi is also among the 14 submissions selected for the second round
of the competition in July 2009 as one of the few submissions with no major
weaknesses detected thus far. While Hamsi reuses the round components of the
Serpent block cipher [5], its larger block size and different round structure make
existing cryptanalytic results on Serpent hardly useful in its security analysis.
So far, little research has been published on the resistance of Hamsi to com-
mon cryptanalytic attacks: in a work independent from ours, C¸alık and Turan
studied differential properties of Hamsi-256, and presented message-recovery and
pseudo-second-preimage attacks. Near collisions were studied by Nikolic´ [12] and
Wang et al. [17], as discussed in Section 4.3.
We study the resistance of Hamsi to differential and higher-order differential
cryptanalysis, with focus on the 256-bit version Hamsi-256. In Section 3, we
show by higher-order analysis that the 3-round compression function of Hamsi-
256 does not achieve maximal degree. This is demonstrated by showing that the
output of certain related chaining values (with fixed message word) or related
message words (with fixed chaining value) sums to zero with a high probability.
In Sections 4 and 5, we focus on differential cryptanalysis and construct high-
probability differential paths for the 3-round compression function as well as the
full 6-round output transformation. The former gives near-collisions on (256−25)
bits of the compression function output, with only six differences in the input
chaining value. Section 4 describes a technique for building low-weight, high-
probability differential paths for Hamsi. Finally, Section 5 presents differential
paths for six rounds of Hamsi-256 that show that the output transformation of
Hamsi-256 does not behave ideally.
2 Description of Hamsi-256
This section describes the hash function Hamsi-256, henceforth just called Hamsi.
We refer to [8] for a complete specification.
2.1 High-level structure
Like most hash functions, Hamsi builds on a finite-domain compression function,
which is used to process arbitrary-length messages through the use of a domain
extender (or operation mode). The compression function of Hamsi can be divided
into four operations:
Message expansion E : {0, 1}32 → {0, 1}256
Concatenation C : {0, 1}256 × {0, 1}256 → {0, 1}512
Non-linear permutations P, Pf : {0, 1}512 → {0, 1}512
Truncation T : {0, 1}512 → {0, 1}256
The message M to hash is appropriately padded and split into ` blocks of 32 bits:
M1, . . . ,M`. Each block is iteratively processed by the compression function,
which operates on a 512-bit internal state viewed as a 4×4 matrix of 32-bit
words.
Figure 1 depicts an iteration of the compression function H (or Hf ). Starting
from the predefined initial value (IV) h0, Hamsi iteratively computes the digest
h of M as follows:
hi = H(hi−1,Mi) = (T ◦ P ◦ C(E(Mi), hi−1))⊕ hi−1 for 0 < i < ` ,
h = Hf (h`−1,M`) = (T ◦ Pf ◦ C(E(M`), h`−1))⊕ h`−1 .
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Fig. 1. Domain extension algorithm of Hamsi.
2.2 Internals of the compression function of Hamsi
Message expansion. The message expansion of Hamsi uses a linear code to
expand a 32-bit word into eight words (that is, 256 bits). We write an expanded
Mi as (m0, . . . ,m7). Thus, the mj ’s are defined as the product of a multiplication
with the generator matrix of the code:
E(Mi) = (m0, . . . ,m7) = (Mi ×G) ,
where G can be found in [8].
Concatenation. The concatenation function C forms a 512-bit internal state
from the 256-bit expanded message (m0, . . . ,m7) and the 256-bit incoming chain-
ing value hi = (c0, . . . , c7) (Figure 2):
C(m0, . . . ,m7, c0, . . . , c7) = (m0,m1, c0, c1, c2, c3,m2,m3,m4,m5, c4, c5, c6, c7,m6,m7) ,
m3
m0 m1 c0 c1
c2 c3 m2
m4 m5 c4 c5
c6 c7 m6 m7
concatenation C
(m0, m1, . . . , m7, c0, c1, . . . , c7)
Fig. 2. Concatenation of expanded message words m0, . . . ,m7 and chaining value words
c0, . . . , c7 in Hamsi.
Truncation. The truncation function T selects eight 32-bit words among the
16 from the internal state to form the new chaining value after feedforward
(Figure 3):
T (s0, s1, s2, . . . , s14, s15) = (s0, s1, s2, s3, s8, s9, s10, s11) .
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truncation T
s0 s1 s2 s3
s4 s5 s6 s7
s8 s9 s10 s11
s12 s13 s14 s15
s0 s1 s2 s3
s8 s9 s10 s11
Fig. 3. Truncation selects eight out of 16 words of the internal state.
Permutations. Finally, we describe the permutations P and Pf . They only
differ in the number of rounds (three for P and six for Pf )†† and in the round
constants. The round function is composed of three layers. First, constants and
a counter are XORed to the whole internal state. Then there is a substitution
layer, followed by a linear layer.
The substitution layer uses one 4-bit Sbox of the block cipher Serpent [5], in
a bitsliced way. That is, four bits, one from each of the four 32-words of the same
column in the 4×4 internal state matrix are first extracted and then replaced
after application of the Sbox. We denote sji the j-th bit of the internal state
word si. The substitution layer can be described as follows, for 0 ≤ j ≤ 31 and
0 ≤ i ≤ 3:
(sji , s
j
i+4, s
j
i+8, s
j
i+12) := S(s
j
i , s
j
i+4, s
j
i+8, s
j
i+12) ,
where S is the 4×4 Sbox given in Table 7 (Appendix A).
The linear diffusion layer applies the Serpent linear transform L : {0, 1}128 →
{0, 1}128 to each of the four diagonals of the state, as follows:
(s0, s5, s10, s15) := L(s0, s5, s10, s15)
(s1, s6, s11, s12) := L(s1, s6, s11, s12)
(s2, s7, s8, s13) := L(s2, s7, s8, s13)
(s3, s4, s9, s14) := L(s3, s4, s9, s14) .
The algorithm below (read column by column) describes the linear transform L
on input (a, b, c, d), with x≪ k denoting the left bit rotation of k positions on
the word x and x k denoting the left bit shift of k positions on the word x.
a := a≪ 13 d := d≪ 7
c := c≪ 3 a := a⊕ b⊕ d
b := a⊕ b⊕ c c := (b 7)⊕ c⊕ d
d := (a 3)⊕ c⊕ d a := a≪ 5
b := b≪ 1 c := c≪ 22
3 Higher-order differential analysis
This section reports on properties of Hamsi related to higher-order derivatives.
After some definitions, we present upper bounds on the algebraic degree of
††While 6 rounds remains the official parameter, the designer has suggested 8 rounds
as a conservative alternative. Our results indicate that moving to 8 rounds may be a
necessary precaution.
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Hamsi’s compression function and show how to exploit them to find “k-sums”
and “zero-sums”. This illustrates the fact that, due to its low algebraic degree,
the compression function of Hamsi does not behave ideally.
3.1 Definitions
Higher-order derivatives. Higher-order differential analysis [7,10] of crypto-
graphic algorithms generalizes the notion of differential cryptanalysis by consid-
ering derivatives of order two or more. It is based on the basic observation that
for a function f with algebraic degree s ≥ 1, the degree of a dth-order derivative
of f is at most (s− d), where s ≥ d. Consequently, an sth-order derivative of f
is a constant and an (s+ 1)st-order derivative of f is zero, which directly gives
a 2s+1-sum for f .
In the following we consider derivatives of functions with domain {0, 1}n,
n ≥ 1 and range {0, 1}. Note that a (certain type of) d-th order derivative is
then the XOR of 2d values of the function for the 2d choices of d input bits.
k-sums. The k-sum problem is, given k lists of random n-bit values (for ex-
ample, k distinct instances of a compression function f1, . . . , fk) , to find one
value from each list such that the sum of the k values is zero. The case k = 2 is
essentially the collision problem.
The k-sum problem can be solved in polynomial time (using the XHASH
attack [2]) when k ≥ n. However, the problem is believed to be hard for small
k. The standard method for the k-sum problem with small k is Wagner’s “gen-
eralized birthday” method, which requires time and space O(k2n/(1+log k)) [16]
(see also [3]).
Henceforth, we consider the problem of finding k values whose images by
a same function f sum to zero. Note that if f has degree s < (n − 1), then a
2s+1-sum can be found by returning the values corresponding to a (s+1)st order
derivative.
An example of application of k-sums is to forge message authentication codes
(MACs). Let H he a hash function and consider the “prefix-MAC” construction
defined as MACK(m) = trunc (H(K‖m)), where trunc is a function removing
some bits of the hash output to combat length extension attacks. Assume we
know messages m1, . . . ,mk such that the probability
Pr
K
[
k⊕
i=1
H(K‖mi) = 0
]
= p
is nonzero. Then by querying MACK with m1, . . . ,mk−1 we can determine
MACK(mk) with probability p and thus break the existential forgery of MAC.
This can be generalized to messages whose MAC tags sum to any fixed value,
to other MAC constructions, etc. For example, one may fix a message and forge
the MAC HK(m) where K is the IV of H by making related-key queries.
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Zero-sums. We define the zero-sum problem as a particular case of the k-sum
problem: given a function f , find distinct values that sum to zero such that their
images by f also sum to zero.
Both the XHASH attack [2] and Wagner’s generalized birthday [16] can be
adapted to find zero-sums. These methods are generic, and are probabilistic
algorithms whose failure probability can be made exponentially small.
3.2 On the degree of the compression function
Simple bounds. The only nonlinear component of Hamsi’s compression func-
tion is the layer of 4×4 Sboxes. One round thus has degree three (see [14] for
explicit expressions of the Sboxes used), so N rounds have degree at most 3N ,
with respect to any choice of variables.
If variables are chosen in c0, . . . , c3 only, or in c4, . . . , c7 only, then they are
all in distinct slices and thus go into distinct Sboxes in the first round. Hence,
the first round is linear and after N rounds, the degree is at most 3N−1. This
means that the degree is at most 81 after five rounds, and that at least six rounds
are necessary to reach maximal degree. In particular, the 3-round compression
function has degree at most 9 with respect to choices of 128 variables in distinct
slices, which distinguishes it from a randomly chosen function (whose degree
would be below 9 with negligible probability).
Case of four variables. If four variables are chosen in the LSB’s of c0, . . . , c3,
after the first application of the Sbox, all the LSB’s of a given word depend
on the bit varied in the corresponding column. Since only one bit is varied per
column, the degree of equations corresponding to LSB’s are of degree 1. Then,
the linear function L(a, b, c, d) is applied to each column, and we can determine,
for a given bit of the state, whether it depends on the single variable of its
diagonal. Based on this, we can determine whether a given 4-bit slice depends
on 1, 2, 3, or 4 of the variables.
A simple computer-assisted analysis revealed that each slice depends on only
one variable. Therefore, the (3-round) compression function of Hamsi always has
degree 3 with respect to four variables in the first four LSB’s, for any values of
the other bits. Ideally, the function should have degree 4 with probability 1/2,
over the choice of the other input bits.
3.3 Finding k-sums for the compression function
For randomly chosen 256-bit values, finding 4-sums for the compression function
of Hamsi requires an effort of complexity approximately 4 · 2256/3 ≈ 287, using
the generalized birthday method. Below we show efficient methods to find 16-,
8-, and 4-sums.
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16-sums. Recall the above observation that three rounds have degree at most 3
with respect to a certain choice of four variables. This observation can directly be
used to find 16-sums, without any computation. Based on empirical observations,
we discovered that we can do better, as presented below.
8-sums. Choose a random value of one 256-bit chaining value, then select seven
other chaining values, which are different from the first one only in the LSB’s of
the first three 32-bit words. Denote these chaining values by h0, . . . , h7. Choose
a random 32-bit message block M , then compute
∑7
i=0H(h
i,M), In 1 000 000
such tests, the above sum was zero in 1458 cases (whereas for a random mapping,
the probability to obtain zero is negligible). This indicates that there are 3rd-
order derivatives with the value zero (or 8-sums) of a high probability for the
compression function of Hamsi. It is very likely that one can identify other 3rd-
order derivatives of higher probabilities (our search was limited).
4-sums. We found 2nd-order derivatives with value zero, that is, 4-sums. One
example is when one chaining value is the IV of Hamsi specified in [9], and where
the three others differ only in two LSB’s of the second words; the XOR of the
four outputs is the all-zero string (note that the four inputs also sum to zero,
thus this is also a zero-sum).
Via an exhaustive search over all 232 message words, we identified 70 messages
for which the above four chaining values lead to a 4-sum. We also found 4-sums
for the IV given in [8], for 86 values of the 32-bit message block. Although
complete analytical justification of these observations remains to be found, the
results of these observations strongly differ from what one obtains for a random
mapping (for which a 2nd-order derivative is zero with negligible probability).
k-sums for fixed chaining value. Here we report on the case where the
chaining value is fixed and where only the message block is varied. The outputs
of the compression function in this case has a much higher algebraic degree.
Consider h0, the IV specified in [9], and 219 values of the 32-bit message block
obtained by varying the first and second bytes, and the three least significant bits
of the third byte. The remaining bits can be fixed to arbitrary values. Denoting
these message words by m0, . . . ,m219−1, we have:
219−1⊕
i=0
H(h0,mi) = 0 .
This observation holds for any initial chaining variable. Here we obtain zero
because we perform a 19th-order derivative of a function of degree 18 only.
Indeed, in the first round at most two bit variables enter a same Sbox, hence
the degree of the first round is 2. Since the two subsequent rounds have degree
3 each, the three rounds have degree 2× 3× 3 = 18.
Note that if Pf is replaced by P in Hamsi’s domain extender, then the above
observation can be used to forge MAC’s (cf. Section 3.1), which shows that the
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extended 6-round output transformation is necessary, and cannot be removed
without compromising the security of Hamsi.
3.4 Finding zero-sums for the output permutation
We describe a dedicated method to find large zero-sums for the 6-round per-
mutation of the finalization function of Hamsi(we stress that it only applies to
the internal permutation and not to the finalization as a whole, for it puts no
restriction on the initial state). Contrary to Wagner’s and the XHASH methods,
it is deterministic rather than probabilistic, and needs to evaluate (and to know)
only half the function.
In the spirit of [15, §9], we present an “inside-out” technique that exploits
the fact that two halves of Hamsi’s permutation have low algebraic degree. This
differs from our method for finding k-sums which exploited the low degree of the
full permutation. The attack works as follows:
1. Choose an arbitrary value for the state of Hamsi’s permutation after three
rounds.
2. Choose 28 distinct bits of the state.
3. Compute the 228 initial states obtained by varying these bits and inverting
the first three rounds of the permutation.
We obtain 228 values that sum to zero, since their sum is the 28th-order derivative
with respect to three inverse rounds. Their images also sum to zero, since they
are the 28th-order derivative with respect to three forwards rounds (although
the images are unknown, and need not be computed).
The method works whenever a function can be written as the composition of
two low-degree functions. As explained in [4], the proposed technique is slightly
more efficient than previous methods, for finding (here) zero-sums of 228 ele-
ments.
4 First order differential analysis
In this section, we analyze the differential properties of the Hamsi round trans-
formations and show how to find high-probability differential paths for up to six
rounds. Since we use XOR differences in our analysis, the differential propaga-
tion is deterministic in the message expansion and in the linear layer based on
the L transform. However, the propagation of differences through the Sbox layer
is probabilistic and depends on the actual values of the input. To maximize the
differential probability of a differential path, we try to minimize the number of
active Sboxes during the path search.
4.1 Differential properties of the Sbox
The differential distribution table (DDT) of the 4-bit Hamsi Sbox S is given
in Table 8 (Appendix A). Note that about half the differential transitions are
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impossible. The probabilities of the non-zero differentials are either 2−2 or 2−3.
In our approach, besides minimizing the number of active Sboxes, we thus try
to minimize the number of probability-2−3 differentials.
4.2 Differential properties of the linear transform L
The linear transform L has on average good diffusion properties, that is, a few
differences in the input lead to many differences in the output. Additionally,
each bit of L contributes to one of the 128 Sboxes in each round. To minimize
the number of active Sboxes, we thus need to minimize number of differences
in L. The Hamming weight (HW) of a difference is a good heuristic to measure
the quality of a differential path. In the following, we first analyze the difference
propagation through the linear layer for differences with HW one.
If we introduce a single input difference at bit position i in one input word,
the HW of the output differences depends on the position and word of the input
difference. In Table 1 and Table 2 give the HW of the output difference for each
of the 128 single bit input differences.
We observe that for some specific words and bit positions, the resulting HW
can be quite small. This happens if one or more differences are removed by
the shift operation. More specifically, the branch number of L is only 3, so
certain 1-bit input differences lead to only a 2-bit output difference, and vice
versa. Table 1 and Table 2 show the worst case of diffusion, that is, the output
HW for a multiple-bit input difference can be upper bounded by summing the
corresponding table entries. However, when inserting many differences in several
input words, some bit differences might erase each other, thus lowering the overall
HW.
Table 1. Hamming weight of output differences if a single difference is introduced at
one input word of the 128-bit linear transformation (a′, b′, c′, d′) = L(a, b, c, d) of Hamsi
in forward direction. The total and word-wise Hamming weight of the output difference
is given depending on the bit position i and input word of the input difference.
Difference in Position i of Total HW of HW of output diff. in
Conditions (mod 32)
input word input difference output diff. a′ b′ c′ d′
a
16,17 3 2 1 - - i + 13 > 28, i + 14 > 24
18 4 2 1 1 - i + 13 > 28, i + 14 ≤ 24
11. . . 15 6 3 1 1 1 i + 13 ≤ 28, i + 14 > 24
else 7 3 1 2 1 i + 13 ≤ 28, i + 14 ≤ 24
b
24. . . 30 2 1 1 - - i + 1 > 24
else 3 1 1 1 - i + 1 ≤ 24
c
21. . . 27 6 2 1 2 1 i + 4 > 24
else 7 2 1 3 1 i + 4 ≤ 24
d 3 1 - 1 1
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Table 2. Hamming weight of input differences if a single difference is introduced at one
output word of the 128-bit linear transformation (a′, b′, c′, d′) = L(a, b, c, d) of Hamsi in
backward direction. The total and word-wise Hamming weight of the input difference
is given depending on the bit position i and output word of the output difference.
Difference in Position i of Total HW of HW of input diff. in
Conditions (mod 32)
output word output difference input diff. a b c d
a′ 2. . . 4 2 1 1 - - i + 27 > 28
else 3 1 1 - 1 i + 27 ≤ 28
b′
28. . . 31 3 1 2 - - i > 28, i > 24
25. . . 28 4 1 2 - 1 i ≤ 28, i > 24
never 6 1 3 1 1 i > 28, i ≤ 24
else 7 1 3 1 2 i ≤ 28, i ≤ 24
c′ 3 - 1 1 1
d′ 29. . . 31 4 1 - 1 2 i > 28
else 5 1 - 1 3 i ≤ 28
4.3 Near-collisions for the compression function
Using our observations on the differential properties of Hamsi’s Sbox and linear
transform, we first searched manually for high-probability paths leading to near-
collisions for the compression function, given some difference in the chaining
value.
Previous work by Nikolic reported near collisions [12] on (256−25) bits with
14 differences in the chaining value; work by Wang et al. reported [17] near
collisions on (256− 23) bits with 16 differences. Below we present near collisions
on (256 − 25) bits with only six differences in the chaining value, using the
differential path in Table 3.
The differential path in Table 3 is followed with probability 2−26 under stan-
dard uniformity and independence assumptions. However, for the IV defined
in [9] the path is followed with probability 2−23. This is because of the condi-
tion put by the two fixed bits in each Sbox. These probabilities were verified
experimentally.
Finally, note that the near collisions also result in other 4-sums: for example,
for the IV h0 specified in [9], the IV h1 obtained by applying the weight-6 initial
difference in Table 3, and the message M1 = C33BE456 and M2 = C8D1B855, we
have:
1. A near collision between H(h0,M1) and H(h1,M1).
2. A near collision between H(h0,M2) and H(h1,M2).
3. A 4-sum H(h0,M1)⊕H(h1,M1)⊕H(h0,M2)⊕H(h1,M2) = 0.
For inputs of an “ideal” function, the latter equality is unlikely to hold with
probability 2−23, but rather with probability close to 2−256.
In the following, we automate our search for high-probability differential
paths. Our heuristic algorithm, described in the next section, produced good
differential paths for up to six rounds of Hamsi.
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Table 3. Differential path for three rounds of Hamsi with probability 2−26.
It. Sbox input Sbox output Prob.
1
00000000 00000000 00020000 00000002
00004000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00020000 00000002
00004000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000002
00004000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00020000 00000000
8
2
00000000 00000000 00000000 00080000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00080000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00080000
3
3
80000000 00000000 02000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00100000
00020000 00000000 00010000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 04000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 04100000
80020000 00000000 02010000 04100000
00020000 00000000 00000000 00000000
80000000 00000000 02010000 00000000
15
End
00000000 80400800 00000000 10C130C0
00040105 00000000 04020000 08000000
00020400 A040A0A2 00000000 10004000
00000040 08000000 00820801 00000000
4.4 Automated differential path search
As before, we search for differential paths with some difference in the input and
output chaining value, and no difference in the input message. The resulting
6-round paths allow us to distinguish the output transform from random, as
shown in Sect. 5.4.
Our primary heuristic is to minimise the HW of the differences in each round.
To achieve that goal, we start with a very low HW (1 or 2 bit) difference in the
middle of the path (at the start of round 3 for a 6-round search) and let the
difference spread in both forward and backward directions. Additionally, we try
to maximise the transition probabilities and randomize the search.
More precisely, our automated differential path starts from the input of the
Sbox layer in round 3, forcing a 1-bit or 2-bit input difference on only one Sbox
position i (among the 128 possible bit positions). We then choose one of the best
differential transitions through the forward application of the Sbox and apply
the linear layer on this new internal state. By best Sbox transitions, we mean
the transitions that lead to a low HW after the application of the linear layer. To
keep the search complexity feasible, we apply the L-layer to each active S-box
separately and use the sum of the HWs as an estimate of the total output HW
at the end of each round. Since the path is sparse, the sum of HWs proves to
be a good heuristic. We continue picking the best differential transitions for all
the active Sbox positions until the end of the fifth round of the output function
of Hamsi. As the final output HW of the difference does not influence the path
complexity, we optimise for transition probabilities in the last round, and pick
the most probable differential Sbox transitions (not the ones minimizing the
HW). Finally, we apply the very last linear layer to obtain the full path.
The backward computation is done analogously in the middle rounds, apply-
ing the linear layer backward and picking the best backward differential transi-
tions for all active Sboxes. In the first round (the last round when computing
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backward) we impose additional restrictions in order to fulfill constraints on the
message expansion.
As we force no difference in the message input of the compression function,
we expect the 256-bit expanded message word to contain no difference at all.
Hence, in the first round we only allow Sbox transitions where the difference in
the expanded message bits is zero. Note that the probabilities of the first-round
transitions do not affect the complexity of the path, as long as they are different
from 0. Indeed, in the first round we can use the freedom of the chaining input
to fulfill the conditions on the Sboxes and we expect the complexity cost of this
first round to be negligible.
In order to increase our chances to obtain a good trail, we randomized the
search with several parameters. First, we randomized the first 1-bit or 2-bit per-
turbation introduction in the output of round 3, as well as its position i among
the 128 Sbox locations. Furthermore, we are also randomizing the Sbox transi-
tions when several candidates are equally good. Finally, another improvement
has been incorporated in our implementation: after having found a potentially
interesting 6-round candidate, we recompute the forward search by allowing
more differential transitions through the Sbox. Said in other words, after hav-
ing placed ourselves in an interesting differential paths subspace, we look in the
neighborhood if better ones exist.
Our heuristic search revealed that after three rounds in both backward and
forward directions, the diffusion of Hamsi is not sufficient to avoid high-probability
differential paths and we can find a differential path with a rather low total HW
and good probability. We were able to construct a 6-round differential path with
a relatively high probability, which is used to distinguish the the whole Hamsi
output transformation in the following section.
5 Non-randomness of the ouput transformation
5.1 The differential path
The best 6-round path produced by our randomized search program is depicted
in Table 4. We can find an input pair (chaining values and messages) conforming
to this path with a probability of 2−206. Note that in the first round we have a
probability of 2−58 for a random message and a random chaining value. However,
we can fix a suitable message (see below), and choose a valid chaining value bit-
by-bit such that the desired output difference is guaranteed. This means that
we can find a conforming input pair to the differential path with a complexity
of about 2148.
5.2 First round and message expansion
In the first iteration, active S-boxes impose conditions on the expanded message:
for a given non-zero Sbox differential, only one or two pairs of values of the
corresponding two expanded message bits are possible. Since we have only 32
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Table 4. Differential path for six rounds of Hamsi with probability 2−148.
It. Sbox input Sbox output Prob.
start
00000000 00000000 84004880 4081C400
2C020018 000045C0 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 84024880 4081C400
28020018 000045C0 00000000 00000000
1
00000000 00000000 84004880 4081C400 04000000 00000000 04000000 40818000
(58)
2C020018 000045C0 00000000 00000000 28020018 000040C0 04020000 00000000
00000000 00000000 84024880 4081C400 00000018 00004100 00000800 00804000
28020018 000045C0 00000000 00000000 04020000 000004C0 80024880 00004400
2
00000000 00000000 00000000 00010000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00010000
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30000010 00000080 00000000 00000080 30000000 00000000 00000000 00000080
30000010 00000080 00000000 00010080 00000010 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000080 00000000 00000000
3
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
3
20000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 20000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
20000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
4
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000008 40000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
5
40000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 40000000 00000000 00000000 00000008
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000008
5
04038000 00000000 00000200 00000010 80000000 00001000 00000000 00200410
33
80000000 00001000 00000000 00000010 04038002 00001000 00000801 00000000
00000002 00000000 00000a01 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00200400 84038002 00000000 00000a01 00200400
6
08420002 F8022900 00000000 30821140 08830144 A0022100 0C051080 10C01000
90
0903000C 00000000 04001002 00000000 0181014C 58A04845 0C051082 22406340
00000000 A0A26145 00041080 12807200 01800148 58A04845 08011002 22406340
01C0014A 00000000 08051082 10420000 00400002 58000800 00040080 20020140
End
CD9F7546 362513EA 56FE147F 85F6B1E1
8D0682FD F100928A B44C3D06 18A0D101
B8871BEA 70315A82 4819C14B 26257026
A1DD0199 40072022 8329356A A744E830
degrees of freedom in the message, we need to keep the number of active Sboxes
in the first round low. To improve the probability of finding a suitable message
candidate, we can vary the differences in the chaining values, whenever several
input differences lead to the same output difference of the first Sbox layer. These
relaxable differential Sbox transitions are listed in Table 5. In our path, five of the
23 active Sboxes of the first iteration are relaxable. In total, we have only nine
Sboxes with two constraints on the message bits; 12 Sboxes with one constraint
on the message; and two S-Boxes with a “half” constraint on the message (three
of four bit pairs are possible). Therefore, we expect to find 232−2×9−12 ·( 34)2 ≈ 2
13
messages satisfying the relaxed first round differential. In practice, we found one
such message using the constants of permutation P and three messages using
the constants of the output permutation Pf (see the full version of this paper
for an example [1]). Note that finding conforming message words can be done in
232 by exhaustive search. The complexity to find chaining values such that the
first four rounds of the path are satisfied is about 225, since we can fulfill the
conditions in the first round deterministically.
Table 5. Relaxable differential transitions for the first round of the Hamsi Sbox. The
first table shows the possible input differences that give the same output if 1, 4 and 5 are
the only possible Sbox input differences. The second table shows the same possibilities if
2, 8, and 10 are the only possible Sbox input differences. For each underlined transition
two message pairs are possible, while for the other transitions only one message pair is
possible.
Desired 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
output a b ab c ac bc abc d ad bd abd cd acd bcd abcd
Possible 1 4 1 1 1
input 5 5 4 4 5
Desired 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
output a b ab c ac bc abc d ad bd abd cd acd bcd abcd
Possible 2 2 2 2
input 8 8 8 8
5.3 Last round and truncation
In order to improve the probability of the differential path, we consider truncated
differentials in the last application of the Sbox. Namely, we relax the Sbox tran-
sitions by fixing some bits in the output difference, while letting the remaining
bits vary. Since the “a”-bits and “c” bits diffuse faster through the linear layer
(see Table 1), we chose to fix these bits in the output of each Sbox. Amongst
four different truncated output differences (?0?0, ?0?1, ?1?0 and ?1?1), we chose,
for each input, the output difference with the highest probability. Table 6 lists
the relaxed input-output transitions for the Sbox. Details of the path used can
be found in the full version of the article [1].
Relaxing the Sbox transitions increases the probability of the last round to
2−61.8, giving a total path complexity 2−120.8. At the same time, since the “wild
card” bits are chosen to have low diffusion, the difference is still fixed in 180 bits
of the chaining value. Thus, we obtain a distinguisher by observing the difference
in these output bits.
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Table 6. Relaxed differential transitions for the last round of the Hamsi Sbox. The
table shows the chosen set of output differences for each given input difference. Un-
derlined transitions have probability 2−2, while the other transitions have probability
2−3.
input 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
a b ab c ac bc abc d ad bd abd cd acd bcd abcd
output 12 3 1 10 1 2 4 5 8 2 1 11 1 7 2
14 9 9 3 8 12 7 10 8 9 3 13 10
13 10
15
mask 11?0 ?0?1 ?001 1010 00?1 ?0?0 ?100 ?1?1 10?0 ?0?0 ?001 1011 00?1 ?1?1 ?010
5.4 Distinguishing the output transformation
To distinguish the output transformation of Hamsi we use the concept of dif-
ferential q-multicollision introduced by Biryukov et al. in the cryptanalysis of
AES-256 [6] and applied to the SHA-3 candidate SIMD in [11]. Originally, dif-
ferential q-multicollision have been applied to a block cipher but can be eas-
ily adapted to a random function. A differential q-multicollision for a random
(compression) function f(H,M) is a set of two differences ∆H, ∆M and q pairs
(H1,M1), (H2,M2), . . . , (Hq,Mq) such that:
f(H1,M1)⊕ f(H1 ⊕∆H,M1 ⊕∆M) =
f(H2,M2)⊕ f(H2 ⊕∆H,M2 ⊕∆M) =
. . .
f(Hq,Mq)⊕ f(Hq ⊕∆H,Mq ⊕∆M)
The generic complexity to find differential q-multicollision for a random function
f with output size n is at least q · 2 q−2q+2 ·n evaluations of f .
In the case of Hamsi-256, the function f is the output transformation, the
message difference ∆M is zero and the output size is n = 256. The generic
complexity to find differential q-multicollision should be q · 2 q−2q+2 ·256 and we get
for q = 8 a generic complexity of 2156.1. Using our differential path of Section 5.1,
we get for q = 8 a complexity of 8·2148 = 2151. Hence, for q ≥ 8 we can distinguish
the output transfomation of Hamsi from a random function, since we expect to
find a q-multicollision approximately 32 times faster than for an ideal transform.
Due to the relaxed conditions, we only fix a truncated difference in 180 output
bits and hence, we get n = 180. In this case, the generic complexity for q = 11 is
q · 2 q−2q+2 ·180 = 2128.1. Using the relaxed differential path, we get q · 2120.8 = 2124.3
and hence, can distinguish the output transfomation of Hamsi from a random
function for q ≥ 11.
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6 Conclusion
We investigated the resistance of the 256-bit version of the second round SHA-3
candidate Hamsi against differential and higher-order differential attacks.
Using higher-order analysis, we showed that the 3-round compression func-
tion of Hamsi has suboptimal algebraic degree. Using this observation, we pro-
vided sets of four related IV’s such that the outputs of the compression function
obtained with a given fixed message sum to zero. We also presented a set of 219
message words such that the output chaining values, using any fixed IV, sum to
zero. The latter result indicates that the compression function of Hamsi, when
seen as a function of message words, does not reach the expected maximal degree
27. As an application, we note that the low degree makes the standalone com-
pression function existentially forgeable in the message authentication setting.
Further, we constructed high-probability differential paths for the 3-round
compression function to demonstrate a near-collision on (256−25) bits with only
six differences in the input chaining value. We have also developed a technique
for building low-weight, high-probability differential paths for more rounds of
Hamsi. Our best differential path for six rounds has probability 2−148, much
higher than expected for a random function. Additionally, we gave a truncated
differential on 180 output bits with probability 2−120.8. These are the first results
on six rounds of Hamsi, allowing us to distinguish the full output transformation
from a random function using differential q-multicollisions.
Although none of our findings directly leads to an attack on the hash al-
gorithm, they indicate that the buildings blocks of Hamsi exhibit nonrandom
behavior. We expect our work to serve as a starting point for future analysis of
Hamsi.
In order to prevent more serious attacks, we recommend increasing the num-
ber of rounds in the output transformation as a precaution. While the current
specification does not include performance figures for the 8-round alternative,
this change is only expected to noticeably affect the speed of hashing short mes-
sages.
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A The Sbox of Hamsi
Table 7. The Hamsi Sbox in decimal basis.
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
S[x] 8 6 7 9 3 12 10 15 13 1 14 4 0 11 5 2
Table 8. The differential distribution table (DDT) of the Hamsi Sbox in decimal basis.
In \ Out 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 2 2 2 0 4 2
2 0 0 0 4 0 4 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 4
3 0 4 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 2 2
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 4 4 0 4 0 0
5 0 4 0 2 2 2 2 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
6 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 2
7 0 0 0 0 4 2 0 2 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 2
8 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 4 0 2 0 0 0 4 0 2
9 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 4 2 2 2 2 0 0 0
10 0 0 2 0 2 0 4 0 2 0 4 0 0 0 2 0
11 0 4 0 0 2 0 2 0 2 2 0 0 2 0 0 2
12 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 4 0 4 2 0
13 0 4 2 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0
14 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 0 0 4 2 0
15 0 0 4 2 0 0 0 2 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 0
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